Coordination, Schelling Points & Credible Threats

Coordination Schelling Points and Credible Threats · Open board

Most of the games so far were fights over who gets what. This one flips that: everyone wants the same thing, and the only problem is landing on it together.

Before you start. You already have a Nash equilibrium: an outcome where nobody wants to switch, given what everyone else does. Last lesson, being predictable was a weakness and mixing your moves at random was the fix; this lesson is the opposite case - nobody is trying to beat anyone, and the only puzzle is which of several equally good arrangements you land on together.

The idea in 30 seconds

When several arrangements would make everyone equally happy, the only real problem left is landing on the same one, not finding a stable one.
People converge on the option that stands out on its own, even when it isn’t the best option, because everyone expects everyone else to pick it too.
Two strangers who must meet without talking, choosing among a hundred spots, meet about 1 time in 100 by luck; if half of people would think of one spot first, they meet about 1 time in 4, though that spot is no better.
Some good outcomes need both sides to trust each other first, and neither side wants to move first without some sign the other will follow.
Giving up your own options, visibly and for real, can make you more powerful, not less - that’s what lets a threat or a promise be taken seriously.
A threat only works if breaking it would actually cost you something; free words that cost nothing to say are easy to ignore.

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